In 1977, Suwon complex, the headquarters of Samsung's first electronics and equipment division. Everything looks worse than expected. The floor of the factory is bare concrete, workers rotate the crank to bring parts to and from the production line. The lab is no different from the dilapidated experimental class at a high school. But the work is going on here, especially in the TV department, very attractive. At that time, there was no broadcast station in Korea that could broadcast color. But Samsung engineers have assembled color TVs from every leading company in the world such as RCA, GE, Hitachi … and then use them to design their own model.
The chief engineer in charge is a young man who has graduated from a US university. When asked about Samsung's color TV development strategy, the answer is not the plan to produce the product by buying components overseas and then assembling in Korea. He came up with the exact opposite answer: "Samsung will do everything by itself, even color lights."
The company has placed on the best models abroad as well as signed technical support agreements. He said Samsung will soon export TVs worldwide. This answer is very unconvincing, because in many people's eyes, it can only happen in the next 10 or 15 years, not sooner. Because to become a world-class manufacturer, you need world-class engineers. And that's what Korea is lacking.
But the then president of Samsung, Lee Byung Chul, anticipated that. Not only has he invested in technology, he has built the foundation for engineering teams who can work at the largest companies in any developing country. Yun Soo Chu, who was misled in the corner of the lab, was one of them. He is working on a microwave prototype.
When Zhou joined Samsung in 1973, the company made a challenge to a field that was decades old in the US but new in Korea: producing household goods. Zhou started by designing washing machines, then switched to electric pans. In 1976, he received an unexpected mission. That year, during a visit to the US, a Samsung vice president named J.U.Generally attracted to a new type of oven, which can be heated not by electricity or gas but by microwave. Chung knew that there was no way to sell such an oven at home, because only a few Koreans could buy it. But that is not the main problem. In Korea, when a company looks at new products, the first question is: "Can we export it?"
Americans like convenience, so microwave is the perfect device for this market. As soon as he returned to Korea, Chung suggested Zhou set up a microwave design team for Samsung. As a company behind Japanese and American manufacturers, Samsung has two advantages: cheap workers and is willing to wait to pay back. The company's top priority, according to Chu, is not high profit but high production capacity. And Samsung is particularly interested in modern products, which for the Korean industry at the time, were almost unprecedented.
Traditionally, developing countries often allow their factories to lag a decade behind developed countries like the US. They make bicycles in the automotive era, black and white TV in the era of color TV. Samsung is one of the first companies, belonging to the country to be classified as the "third world", implementing a new approach. It is direct competition in the field of manufacturing modern products.
Zhou started by ordering Jet 230, a new microwave model manufactured by General Electric (GE), a leading US home appliance company. When I first looked at it, then separated each part, he still did not know how this device worked. The plastic compartment looks simple, next to the door and some wire systems. But there are some complex parts, especially the main equipment of microwave, microwave tube (magnetron tube). Samsung cannot create it, at least for now.
Zhou's team was handed about 4.5 square meters in the corner of an old laboratory. The laboratory served the entire electronics department of the company, which at that time consisted of three workshops erected by the assembly. It seems silly when such a place is burning the intention of challenging giant American and Japanese corporations. But Chu knows that Samsung's senior managers are not interested in this, the only thing they want is production. And marketing or selling is something later.
Soon after, Zhou assembled some of the world's leading products and picked out the best parts for his prototype. His previous product, electric pan, did not work well. So this time he told himself he must succeed. However, when Samsung did not have all the necessary equipment, the engineer began to search and find materials everywhere, from plastic suppliers to tool manufacturers. He also had to create many "monstrous" designs to temporarily overcome the material or technical difficulties. But to the magnetic tube section to broadcast microwaves, Zhou was forced to buy completely from Japan, because apart from it, only one other place was Rhode Island, USA.
Zhou spent a long period of months working through the night in the laboratory. It took him 1 year, with 80 hours of work per week, to complete the first prototype. But when the test button was pressed, the plastic chamber was melted. 80 weeks later he used it to rebuild this prototype. Then when testing again, the stirring shaft melted.
Zhou's wife, who is closest to and understands the work of her husband, also began to suspect that he was obsessed, even mad. Sometimes, Zhou also thought that his wife was right. Japanese and Americans, he knows, are selling more than 4 million microwaves each year. And you, can't even get a working prototype.
Microwave technology appeared in 1940 by Raytheon, a US defense contractor. While experimenting with microwave radar for radar, a researcher found that the candy bar in his pocket melted when exposed to waves. That led to the idea of a wave oven. Raytheon and a company, Litton, tried to sell products in the US but did not have much success. Because most households already have electric ovens and few people want a second in the house.
But this product seems ideal for Japan and the country with small houses and narrow kitchens. Moreover, Japanese dishes depend heavily on warming, a strong point of the microwave. But even seeing the potential for sales of microwave ovens in Japan, US companies are still not interested, because exporting to distant markets is not profitable.
That's why Japanese people became the first big microwave oven manufacturer. They have grasped the technology, started to improve and see export opportunities around the world. In 1970, the number of products shipped from Japan was 600,000 and increased to 2.2 million in 1975. In the late 1970s, American equipment manufacturers such as GE began investing seriously in microwave ovens. But the price of late departure is too great. By 1979, the US microwave oven market was controlled by Japanese companies by more than 25%.
In Korea, in June 1978, at the corner of Suwon's lab, Zhou finally completed another prototype. Ready for the worst but when he turned on the start button, nothing melted. He received a lot of encouragement and congratulations from the directors, although this microwave is still too crude to compete in the world market. Zhou himself did not embrace hope to invade the globe. He thinks that at least Samsung will capture a small, cheap segment in the US. But that does not frustrate him, because the company's preeminent goal is manufacturing.
Samsung management sent a few employees to sell these prototype devices. They did not have much success, but nonetheless a temporary production line was signed to establish. The company wants to be ready in case an order appears. This is also one of the basic principles of the company: "Never make customers wait".
At first, only one furnace was created every day. Then it increased to two, then 5 ovens a day. By mid-1979, when more than 5 million ovens were sold worldwide, Samsung had completed production targets of 1,460 units. Unfortunately, the low scale means a high product price, about $ 600 per unit, exceeding the half-year income of an average family in Korea. Almost no one buys this product, but not so that machines stop working. At Samsung, no sales are not a reason to stop growing.
Samsung promotes the search for overseas customers, sends brochures to dozens of countries, is willing to reduce prices and accept every order with the smallest amount. The first order came from Panama, with 240 units. This is essentially a capital loss trade, but a celebration is still held in Suwon, because it marks the fact that they have overcome the first hurdle. This order is also a good way to find out what customers want, so they can refine their products in some small markets before trying big products.
This order also helps Samsung confidently apply for approval to export goods to the US. At the end of 1979, approval was accepted. For companies, the US is not a completely unfamiliar market. That is also the reason why they are willing to do something that few American manufacturers are doing: adjusting products according to the tastes of the users of this country. That means retrofitting the factory in Suwon to create different models for each market. Samsung accepts to consume it.
Meanwhile, the microwave oven is being sold for $ 350-400 USD in the US. Retailer JC Penney wants to find cheaper sources, listened to them, and find Samsung. Penney wants the Korean company to build microwaves for $ 299.
At that time, worldwide microwave oven sales amounted to 4.7 million units per year, while Samsung was only required to make several thousand devices. Not to mention this order requires a completely new design. But that's enough to make Samsung's managers feel lightheaded for days. Actually, at the time, although Penney made a request, Samsung's side would almost accept it. Because what they want is not profit, but a production opportunity and a door to enter this big market.
Despite the technical assistance from the partner, the heavy duty will weigh heavily on Chu and his colleagues. The challenge now is to turn a primitive assembly room into a factory almost overnight. The customer is not in Panama at the moment, but the United States, one of the world's top fastidious users.
Chu's direct manager is Kyung Pal Park, a quiet person. But if you ask why you are here, this man will tell you the story of American soldiers during the Korean War. All he remembers about them is wealth, from clothes, equipment to vehicles, weapons. Mr. Park repeatedly asked: "How did America achieve that?". The answer he received after a long time of reflection, was production. America is rich because it makes everything. Park wants Korea too, a country that not only has rice fields but also factories. In 1969 he joined Samsung. In 1980, at the age of 39, he was named the head of household appliances. Penney's order is the main responsibility of this man.
In American companies, designers belong to a team and other team engineers. But at Samsung, production is king. Therefore, Park unified the design team and engineers, emphasizing that design should go hand in hand to implement ideas in production. He gave the team a rule: "If there is no problem, the goods must be delivered on time, not slow even for just one day."
The responsibility to monitor the work belongs to I.Jang, a production engineer has just been transferred from Samsung's engine division. Before coming here, Jang managed the production of millions of engines each year on four separate lines. Now he stands in a department doing 5 or 6 microwaves every day. But Jang did not consider it a step backward. "There is something appreciated in Samsung, more than high productivity," Jang explained, "It's the potential to create high productivity."
Jang immersed himself in understanding the product, spending hours talking to designers like Zhou, then going abroad to visit producers like Matsushita, Sanyo and GE. After learning world-class production standards, he began to work and make sure Samsung adheres to them. Jang carefully studied each part of the microwave, wondering if they were easy to fix, or if such a design was reasonable for welds. And one of Samsung's highest production managers has personally reached 30 out of 100 welding component suppliers to upgrade the manufacturing process.
He was also one of the people who worked from dawn until 10:30 pm, then took a nap and went back to work until the end of the night. His manager, Park, also has a similar schedule. At Samsung's factory, there are specially designed chairs, scattered all over the place, for those who want to enlist a nap to recover. The collective effort has pushed up manufacturing capacity, from 10 to 15 kilns per day. In the end, they were able to meet Penney's order promptly.
US retailers quickly loved these microwave ovens and soon requested larger quantities. 5,000 units in a month, then 7,000 units. Samsung still responds well, although their employees don't have time to celebrate. "Like a cow," Jang tried to find a comparison image when describing work.
By the end of 1981, Samsung's microwave production had increased to more than 100,000. However, this number is only a small part of the world market and almost no major manufacturers in the US or Japan pay attention. They still do not regard Korea as a serious competitor in technology that requires this sophistication. But they overlooked an important factor: the role of the Korean government in the development of the country.
During this time, the government met with many business managers and economic planners to build the Central Economic Development Board. The job of this department is to think about the direction and opportunity for Korea's economy to be at the top, then encourage to help companies achieve it. Selected companies will receive many advantages in taxes, land, subsidies … Samsung has been seen by government leaders in this country.
In 1982, Samsung's microwave output was about 200,000, double the previous year. But Park and his team didn't think that was enough. They know that the company needs to bring this product to the world. The United States produces more than 2 million units a year, while the Japanese are selling more than 2.3 million units at home and 820,000 in the US. Matsushita has 17% of the world market, Sanyo has 15%.
Moreover, major manufacturers have started the race to lower prices, narrowing Samsung's main advantage. If they want to keep growing, they have to lower prices. But the company still has to import tubes from, the main part of the microwave oven from Japan. The team of engineers tried to approach Japanese manufacturers for technical support but was refused.
That same year, GE began to see dangerous warning signs in its microwave business. Because of entering the market late, GE still has not earned money and started heavy losses. Worse, Japan pushed GE's market share in the US from 16% in 1980 to 14% in 1982.
At the end of 1982, Japan launched a medium-sized oven model, at a price significantly lower than GE's. The company felt a potential threat and a research team was sent to Japan. After traveling for several days in the land of the rising sun, they took advantage of visiting Korea before returning because they heard that Samsung also started manufacturing microwave ovens. Seeing Samsung's scale, property and research capabilities, not only in the microwave field but also in the color TV department, Americans had to change their minds.
Now, GE has two options. One is to invest in technology, like the Japanese way, to reduce production costs. But GE previously invested heavily in refrigerators and dishwashers, giving it a lower priority. That leads to the second option of taking products from abroad through sourcing or joint ventures. GE initially sought joint venture opportunities with Japanese people, but failed. Later, the company also considered Samsung, because only low-cost in Korea could afford to make product prices low enough to take down Japanese rivals.
This American company has spent a lot of time considering the difference in cost. In 1983, to produce a microwave oven, GE spent 218 USD and Samsung only spent 155 USD. GE's labor cost for a product is $ 8, while Samsung is only 63 cents. And yet, the cost of supervision, maintenance and repair at GE is 30 USD, Samsung is 73 cents. GE spent $ 4 on material handling per microwave, Samsung lost 12 cents. GE's management costs up to 10 USD per product, at Samsung 2 cents. If these figures are not scary enough, Samsung workers receive less but must work harder than GE workers. In the US, each person can make 4 products per day while in Korea 9. Once the volume of products increases, the cost of Samsung may be even lower.
GE managers have fluctuated. In order to make the final decision, Bruce Enders, the company's marketing manager, went to Korea himself. At the end of the first meeting, he asked Samsung to come up with a proposal, including costs, delivery schedules and descriptions of how they would build the microwave for GE. In the US, it takes companies four to six weeks to develop a plan like this. The next morning, while Enders were having breakfast with Samsung executives, a group of engineers came and made their suggestions.
"A group of engineers has arrived," Enders later recalled. "They gave us a proposal. Their hair was messed up, their eyes were bloodshot. Those people worked all night. The proposal met our goal. I couldn't believe it. there."
A few weeks later, Roger Schipke, head of GE's home appliances division, also came to Korea. When he was walking down the factory hallway, there was a crowd of white coat people gossiping. He leaned against the wall and watched, seeing that most of them were very young. As they passed, he retained and asked who they were. Managers said it was the newly hired microwave division engineers. Schipke asked where these people were trained. The answer is: Purdue University, University of Southern California, Washington University … All are well-known universities in America. This director was "standing" for a few seconds.
In June 1983, GE was still sourcing small and medium-sized microwaves from the Far East. The company also produces large-size oven models in the US. But GE also provided Samsung with a smaller order, only about 15,000. They want to see if Koreans can deliver high quality goods at a price that even the largest US equipment manufacturers cannot do.
Again, there is an unbreakable rule that "every deadline must be met". To do that, Park knows that he will have to depend on his "warriors" who have maintained discipline to work 70 hours a week. But who exactly are they?
At the Suwon complex, more than half of the assembly workers are women. Most of them worked here for 4 or 5 years, until they graduated from high school and left after getting married. Jo Yon Hwang and Jang Mee Hur are in their twenties. Both came to apply for jobs after hearing good news about Samsung's policies for employees. When they first arrived, they were given blue uniforms and participated in two weeks of training. After that, they were taken to the microwave assembly factory, working 11 hours a day, 27 days a month. Everyone in the factory works with such a schedule, including the director. The two women said that was why they felt so devoted to the company, seeing the boss also work as an employee. In 1988, their basic salary was just over $ 350 a month, equivalent to about $ 1.2 an hour. Men and women are equally paid, the free service comes with medical and lunch. Dinner and breakfast are provided in the company's dining area, for only 15 cents. Workers also receive gifts many times a year such as clothes, shoes, bags or recorders. These recorders are manufactured by Samsung.
Hwang and Hur were off for 5 days in the winter and 5 days in the summer, to take a vacation at a beach owned by Samsung. Like most other female employees in Suwon, Hwang lives freely in the company's dormitory. There are 15 such dormitories, each providing accommodation for 420 women, 6 people per room. Hur lived outside the complex, in an apartment with you. Rent is not a problem because the company lent her $ 2,000 to rent a house. Of course this money will have to be returned when she quit her job. Hur and Hwang often wake up at 6 am and eat breakfast at 7 o'clock, then Hwang walks to the factory and Hur arrives by the company's bus. At the end of the day, Hwang had to return to the dorm before 9.30pm. She even gets three days off every month.
Hwang firmly believes that no workers in the world pay attention to products like workers at Samsung. She often checks her own work, even after an inspection officer has checked it before. Her task is to attach the serial number and label name to the microwave, 1,200 labels a day. And Hur tied the microwave door, about 1,200 pieces a day. Although the job is quite simple, both consider it a challenge to personal discipline.
"I put my spirit and soul in each of these products," Hwang explained.
In addition to workers, Suwon's second largest HR department is engineers. The company has hundreds of engineers, all working 68 hours a week. S.D.Lee is one of them. He was sent to Japan for two weeks to learn technology from Toshiba. Trước chuyến đi đó, anh được đào tạo ba tháng tiếng Nhật. Theo Lee, anh đã quên mọi thứ mình biết từ thời đại học và học được hai điều mới từ khi làm ở Samsung.
"Thứ nhất, quản lý theo mục tiêu. Đặt mục tiêu, sau đó hoàn thành nó bất kể đó là gì ngay cả khi nó có nghĩa là bạn phải làm việc suốt đêm trong một tuần. Thứ hai, luôn luôn nghĩ về vài năm tiếp theo. Tự hỏi điều gì sẽ xảy ra trong thập kỷ tới", anh giải thích.
Nhiệm vụ của Lee đã minh họa cho triết lý đó. Mặc dù lò vi sóng của Samsung đang có chi phí sản xuất thấp nhất trên thế giới, anh vẫn nghiên cứu quá trình tự động hóa để làm cho chúng có thể thấp hơn nữa. Đôi khi, Lee cũng ghen tị với người Mỹ khi họ chỉ phải làm việc 8 giờ một ngày. Tuy nhiên, anh cũng tin rằng không thể đo đếm cuộc sống bằng tiền mà phải bằng lối sống. Cuộc sống của anh đang ngày một tốt hơn và nam nhân viên này có thể sớm mua được một chiếc xe hơi, điều mà cha anh không thực hiện được. "Nếu thế hệ của chúng ta không làm việc chăm chỉ", anh nói. "Thế hệ tiếp theo sẽ bị ảnh hưởng".
Ban đầu, lò nướng của Samsung không đạt tiêu chuẩn GE. Nhưng với sự giúp đỡ của các kỹ sư chất lượng đến từ Mỹ, mọi thứ sớm trở nên tốt hơn. Bruce Enders ngày càng ấn tượng với sản phẩm nhận được và ngày càng tăng số lượng đặt hàng. Tay nghề của công nhân Hàn Quốc đã làm ông hài lòng. Trong chuyến thăm tiếp theo tới Suwon, Enders đã rất ngạc nhiên trước những thay đổi. Dây chuyền lắp ráp đã chuyển từ băng tải con lăn sang cơ chế vận chuyển tự động. Rõ ràng, Samsung có khả năng cung cấp nhiều hơn những gì GE đã yêu cầu. Nhờ đó, doanh số đặt hàng lại tiếp tục tăng lên. Giữa năm 1983, Samsung đã đạt được một cột mốc quan trọng, sản xuất ra chiếc lò vi sóng thứ 500.000. Park nói rằng đã đến lúc ăn mừng. Tất cả nhân viên được tham gia một bữa tiệc ngắn. Khi bữa tiệc kết thúc, mọi người lại trở lại làm việc.
Khu phức hợp Suwon ngày nay đã biến thành thành phố kỹ thuật số của Samsung.
Đến cuối năm 1983, sản lượng lò vi sóng hàng năm của Samsung là 750.000. Đến năm 1984 con số này vượt qua một triệu. Nhà máy liên tục mở rộng với 10 dây chuyền sản xuất hàng loạt. Nhưng đối với Samsung, điều đó không đủ tốt.
Công ty muốn tìm kiếm thị trường mới vì dự kiến doanh số bán lò vi sóng sẽ chậm lại. Họ muốn tiến vào châu Âu, với thị trường dự kiến tăng trưởng 20% mỗi năm. Trách nhiệm khai phá vùng đất mới được giao cho một giám đốc điều hành trẻ tên là J.K.Kim. Giống như nhiều người khác trong công ty, anh tốt nghiệp một trường đại học ở Mỹ, thông thạo nhiều ngoại ngữ. Mặc dù gia đình không khá giả, bố mẹ anh đã tìm mọi cách để đưa con sang Mỹ học. Anh choáng ngợp với sự hiện đại của California, nhưng vẫn quay về Hàn Quốc với quyết tâm giúp xây dựng đất nước.
Với tấm bằng danh giá, Kim có nhiều lựa chọn nghề nghiệp, nhưng anh đã chọn lĩnh vực sản "Nếu tôi làm việc cho một văn phòng luật sư, tôi chỉ tạo ra công ăn việc làm cho bản thân và một thư ký riêng. Ở Samsung, tôi có thể đóng góp cho 10.000 việc làm".
Khi Kim bắt đầu tập trung vào thị trường châu Âu, anh đã tìm hiểu xem nó khác với Mỹ như thế nào. Người châu Âu thích những món ăn lạnh và thích cá hơn thịt hay gà. Thông tin này được đưa trở lại bộ phận thiết kế của Suwon. Chẳng mấy chốc, họ bắt đầu thiết kế những mẫu lò vi sóng mới cho thị trường này. Năm 1983, sản phẩm Samsung tiến vào Đức và Na Uy. Năm 1984, họ có thêm Pháp, Phần Lan, Úc và Bỉ.
Tuy nhiên, không chỉ có bộ phận kinh doanh đi công tác nước ngoài. Samsung học theo nhiều công ty quốc tế, gửi các kỹ sư tới từng thị trường. Khác với các nhân viên kinh doanh, những kỹ sư sẽ tới thăm từng cửa hàng nhỏ, trò chuyện với người bán và thậm chí người mua. Họ cần tìm hiểu xem mẫu lò nào bán chạy nhất, khách hàng khó chịu hay thoải mái gì với kiểu thiết kế của sản phẩm. Tất cả những điều này không thể được giải thích qua các bản báo cáo, điện thoại hay fax. Ví dụ như khách hàng thích màu đỏ, các kỹ sư cần biết đó là loại màu đỏ nào. Tương tự như kích thước và vị trí chính xác của các núm vặn trên thân lò. Có thể nói, các kỹ sư tìm kiếm nhiều hơn về các yếu tố kỹ thuật, một cái gì đó tinh tế hơn dựa trên cảm nhận và thị hiếu, cũng như tính cách của người tiêu dùng ở từng quốc gia, khu vực.
Chẳng mấy chốc, sản phẩm của Samsung đã ngang hàng, thậm chí vượt trội về số lượng hơn các mẫu lò được GE sản xuất tại Mỹ. Một số người ở GE lo lắng, họ muốn cải thiện tình hình sản xuất ở Mỹ. Nhưng dù kế hoạch là như thế nào, chi phí sản xuất vẫn cao hơn nhiều so với ở Hàn Quốc. Tháng 5/1985, GE công khai tuyên bố sẽ ngừng sản xuất lò vi sóng ở Mỹ. Từ giờ trở đi, GE sẽ phụ trách bán hàng và dịch vụ, Samsung sẽ có trách nhiệm sản xuất. Chẳng mấy chốc, cơ sở ở Suwon sẽ là nơi sản xuất lò vi sóng lớn nhất thế giới.
Thành công của Samsung không thể tách rời khỏi sự hỗ trợ của Penney và GE. Người Mỹ đã giúp công ty Hàn Quốc trong việc thiết kế, cải thiện chất lượng, quy mô cũng như mang tới các thỏa thuận bán hàng tốt. Nhưng không thể vì thế mà coi thường sự nỗ lực của Samsung. Một công ty Mỹ mất bao lâu để có thể phát triển lớn mạnh? Còn Samsung đã mất bao lâu để trở thành nhà cung cấp hàng đầu thế giới?
Sau đó, hầu hết các xe đẩy hành lý ở sân bay Frankfurt của Đức đều có quảng cáo cho Samsung. Những người lái xe trên đường phố New York, Chicago, London hay thậm chí cả Tokyo cũng bắt đầu nhìn thấy những tấm biển quảng cáo có thương hiệu Samsung. Một ngày nào đó, Hàn Quốc sẽ không còn cần phải tiếp thị sản phẩm của mình thông qua các nhãn hiệu của Mỹ. Họ sẽ bán chúng trực tiếp, như cách Hyundai đang bán xe của mình.
Quay trở lại Suwon, thật khó để Yun Soo Chu, nhà thiết kế lò vi sóng của Samsung, ngồi yên một chỗ. Anh thà làm việc còn hơn ngồi không để nói chuyện hay trả lời phỏng vấn. Văn phòng của anh không còn là góc nhỏ trong phòng thí nghiệm nữa, nó giờ là một căn phòng rộng lớn với hàng tá bàn làm việc. Bao quanh nó là vô số phòng khác để nghiên cứu và làm thí nghiệm. Đằng sau bàn làm việc của anh là năm chiếc đồng hồ, mỗi cái đánh dấu thời gian tại các văn phòng của Samsung ở LA, Chicago/Mexico, London/ Madrid, Frankfurt/Paris, NYC/Miami. Chu cũng có một bản đồ Thụy Điển trên bàn làm việc. Samsung đã bắt đầu xuất khẩu vào quốc gia này vào năm ngoái. Anh cũng đang tổ chức những chuyến đi đến Thụy Điển cho đội ngũ nhân viên của mình, không phải nhân viên tiếp thị mà là các kỹ sư. Chu muốn họ đến đó nhiều nhất có thể, để biết khách hàng là ai.
Nếu hỏi Chu xem anh ấy làm việc để làm gì, người đàn ông này sẽ nói với bạn mục tiêu cao nhất của anh ấy là mang đến cho con cái một mức sống tốt hơn, ít nhất là so với bản thân anh trong quá khứ. Vì vậy, mỗi buổi sáng, anh sẽ mặc áo khoác của công ty, đứng hát hết bài hát truyền thống của Samsung, sau đó quay trở lại phòng làm việc và thiết kế mẫu lò vi sóng tiếp theo để nó có thể xuất hiện trong các nhà bếp hiện đại trên khắp thế giới. Và như hầu hết mọi ngày, anh có khả năng sẽ ở lại văn phòng của mình rất muộn.